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As the twentieth century draws to a close, the prescience of Amery s pessimistic words seems to be confirmed by the heated debate now underway in the United States over the uniqueness of the Holocaust. Not in recent memory has there been a period in which scholars have fought so strenuously to assert and refute the Holocausts singularity. In books, articles, and internet postings, those defending the Holocausts uniqueness have battled with others who have vehemently challenged it on historical, moral, and political grounds. This debate has been characterized not only by passionate intellectual exchange, but also by sharply polemical accusations and recriminations. In the process of arguing over the similarities and differences between the Holocaust and other genocides, opponents of uniqueness have accused supporters of being worse than neo-Nazi Holocaust deniers, while some uniqueness advocates have charged challengers with antisemitism. The polemical turn in this increasingly polar-ized debate raises a series of questions for our current understanding of the Holocaust. What explains the new concern with uniqueness? Does the mounting challenge to the concept at the end of the twentieth century in fact threaten to submerge the Holocaust's specificity in a general "century of barbarism," as predicted years ago by Amery? Or does the new challenge provide an opportunity to set aside a concept of questionable analytical and historical utility? As we shall see, the current debate poses as many dangers as opportunities for genuine historical understanding.
The debate over uniqueness has arisen in part from the accelerating pace of what may be called "bilateral historicization." At the same time that certain scholars have begun to "historicize" the Holocaust by comparing it to individual cases of genocide, others have moved to historicize such cases of genocide by comparing them to the Holocaust. 2 Predictably enough, the conclusions of both camps have differed substantially. While the former have strongly asserted the uniqueness of the Holocaust, the latter have emphatically challenged this position. The proponents of uniqueness, including the scholars Steven Katz, Deborah Lipstadt, and Daniel Goldhagen, have underscored the Jewish character of the event and have strongly asserted its fundamental singularity. They have defined the Holocaust as the murder of six million Jews, and have identified its uniqueness in two senses: first, in the qualitative difference between the Nazis' assault against the Jews and their persecution of other groups prior to and during the Second World War; and second, in the basic differences between the Holocaust and all previous and subsequent genocides. In contrast, a number of scholars of genocide have vociferously challenged these claims. They insist that the Holocaust was no different from other historical acts of genocide and have called for redefining it to encompass not only the death of six million Jews, but the death of eleven million (and in some estimates as many as twenty-six million) people under the Nazis.
It is not merely the historical arguments against uniqueness put forth by these scholars, however, but also their polemical allegations about the concept's political function that have gained them attention and that merit closer scrutiny. Is it in fact the case, as they claim, that defending the Holocaust's uniqueness is tantamount to denying other genocides? Is uniqueness, in truth, nothing more than a selfaggrandizing expression of Jewish ethnocentrism, a "Zionist" tool for the express political purpose of deflecting criticism away from the state of Israel? While the inflammatory nature of these charges might tempt some to ignore them altogether, our increasing awareness of the instrumentalization of history and memory-especially with respect to the Holocaust-requires that we not dismiss them without a more considered response. To this end, it helps to historicize the question of uniqueness itself as a method of assessing the origins and significance of the current debate.
The Origins of the Uniqueness Question
The question of uniqueness is a relatively new one in Holocaust historiography. The Holocaust's singularity had long been an article of faith for many Jews, but it had never been subjected to rigorous scholarly analysis. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the period in which the term "Holocaust" gained normative status, the uniqueness of the event was seen as deriving from its incomprehensibility. 3 The relative proximity of the Holocaust in the not-so-distant past heightened its unfathomable magnitude and made it appear as something that stood outside of history altogether. Scholars as disparate as Isaac Deutscher and Elie Wiesel despaired at ever achieving any adequate historical understanding of the Holocaust, concluding that the most appropriate response was silence. 4 With the passage of time and the increasing historical distance to the event, however, two major developments began to alter perceptions of the Holocaust. First, as the postwar era progressed there emerged a heightened tendency to hvitoricize the Holocaust, turning it into a comprehensible event that could be subjected to rational historical analysis, often with the help of generalizing theories. Second, beginning in the late 1960s and intensifying in the decades that followed, there emerged an increasing tendency to politicize and exploit the Holocaust for partisan advantage. It was precisely these two trends that in the late 1970s and early 1980s awakened scholarly interest in the concept of uniqueness. Indeed, the widespread adoption of uniqueness by scholars in this period is best understood as part of a self-consciously defensive response to the perceived attempts by others to diminish the event for apologetic or revisionist purposes. This point merits particular attention, for the current critics of uniqueness have largely overlooked the concept s defensive origins in their zeal to characterize it as an aggressive expression of Jewish political interests. For this reason, it is important to survey briefly the postwar historicization and politicization of the Holocaust.
Historicizing the Holocaust
Scholarly interest in the Holocausts uniqueness emerged partly in reaction to attempts to explain the event with the help of generalizing theories. This process of "historicization" (which came to be termed as such only in the 1980s) began as early as the 1950s, when scholars first began to make sense of the recent Nazi experience. 5 The various explanations that emerged over the succeeding decades all made significant contributions to our understanding of the Third Reich, though none succeeded in integrating the Holocaust into a general explanatory framework without substantially marginalizing its significance. 6 This becomes clear in surveying five of the more important concepts used to historicize the Holocaust: totalitarianism, fascism, functionalism, modernity, and genocide.
Totalitarianism
During the 1950s the paradigm of totalitarianism enjoyed considerable prestige as a means of explaining the similarities between the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships. This approach, which fulfilled a useful political function for the West during the early years of the Cold War by associating the Soviet Union with its arch-enemy Nazi Germany, was pioneered by such scholars as Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, both of whom deemphasized the significance of national histories in favor of broader modern trends as factors explaining the genesis of modern dictatorships. 7 But totalitarianism ultimately shed little light on the Holocaust, as it focused on the common means used by the Nazi and Soviet states to establish and administer their dictatorial regimessecret police, concentration camps, and other forms of state terror-rather than the very different ideological ends these regimes pursued. 8 The idea of totalitarianism won its appeal only by ignoring what made Nazi ideology sui generis-its vehement racial antisemitism-and by marginalizing the event that grew out of it, the Holocaust.
Fascism
In the 1960s, the concept of fascism displaced that of totalitarianism for explaining the dynamics of the Nazi state. During this politically turbulent, left-leaning decade, the notion of fascism reflected a return of sorts to the Marxist interpretation of the Third Reich during the 1930s as "the open terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary .. . elements of finance capital." 9 While the notion of fascism gained radical political cachet from the prominent Frankfurt School leader Max Horkheimer-who famously cautioned those unwilling to speak of capitalism to be silent about fascismit found a non-left-wing incarnation in the work of Ernst Nolte, whose seminal study Three Faces of Fascism (1966) identified the essence of fascism in its anti-Bolshevism and opposition to "transcendence." 10 Neither explanation, it turned out, was able to make sense of the Holocaust or explain why, for example, it occurred in Nazi Germany and not in Fascist Italy. Like the notion of totalitarianism, fascism was a convincing theoretical framework only when the Holocaust was bracketed off altogether.
Functionalism
Beginning in the late 1960s, the so-called functionalist or structuralist approach emerged as a new method of explaining Nazism. This approach, though generally left-liberal in character, was less overtly political and has proven a durable explanatory framework, thriving to the present day. Originally, functionalist scholars such as Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen focused on the dynamics of the Nazi state. But beginning in the 1970s and proceeding into the 1980s, they shifted their energy to explaining the Holocaust," ultimately advancing our understanding of the Nazi genocide to a far greater degree than supporters of the paradigms of totalitarianism and fascism. By focusing on the structural factors lurking behind the conceptualization and implementation of the Final Solution, functionalist historians shed new light upon the Holocausts specifically modern dimensions. Still, while functionalists provided a sobering lesson for postwar society by directing attention towards the potential recurrence of mass murder in the present, their de-emphasis of the Holocausts ideological underpinnings-in particular, antisemitism-left important questions unanswered.
Modernity
During the 1980s, the overarching concept of "modernity" was increasingly employed in the effort to historicize both the Third Reich and the Holocaust. This concept, whose emergence reflected an upsurge of scholarly interest in postmodernism, also partly reflected the decade's conservative political tendencies. This was particularly evident in Germany, where the project of historicization took an apologetic direction in the work of the neo-conservative scholar Rainer Zitelmann. Rejecting claims of the Holocaust's uniqueness, Zitelmann argued that the event did not so much reflect the allegedly deviant course of modern German history as the totalitarian potential of modernity. 12 Interestingly, scholars on the left reached similar conclusions. Gotz Aly and Susanna Heim subsumed the genocide of the Jews under a broader and fundamentally rational Nazi program of capitalist exploitation in Eastern Europe, while Zygmunt Baumann reduced it to a combination of modern social engineering and bureaucracy. 13 These scholars all deemphasized the Jewish character of the Holocaust by playing down antisemitism. Thus Arno Mayer explained the Nazi genocide as part of a larger modern ideological war between Nazism and Bolshevism, and Christopher Browning identified universal factors such as careerism, peer pressure, and conformity as responsible for the Nazis' barbarous treatment of the Jews. 14 By the early 1990s, such projects of historicization had generally diminished the Jewish dimensions of the Holocaust and universalized it into a meta-event of grand historical significance for the modern world.
Genocide
Concurrent with the upsurge of interest in the concept of modernity in the 1980s, there arose among scholars a new interest in the concept of genocide. 15 In several wide-ranging works, genocide scholars pursued the broader goal of "contextualizing the Holocaust into Genocide Studies" by subjecting it to rigorous comparative analysis. 16 These scholars argued that the Holocaust was not qualitatively different from other episodes of mass murder in human history, highlighting the similarities between the murder of the Jews and other victims of genocidal violence such as the Armenians, Cambodians, or Native Americans. 17 These scholars also focused attention upon the similarities between the Nazis' persecution of the Jews and other "inferior" groups such as Gypsies, the handicapped, and Slavs, all of whom were murdered as part of the Nazis' broader creation of a racially-based, eugenically-engineered dystopia. 18 Such efforts to analyze the Holocaust as an example of genocide have contributed greatly to the broader cause of historical understanding. Overall, however, die project has been hampered by the absence of a widely accepted definition of the term "genocide" itself. 19 The inability of scholars to agree upon which groups should be regarded as the perpetrators and which the victims has made it difficult to see how the Holocaust relates to other episodes of mass murder that may or may not be similar in character. 20 As a result, the Holocaust continues to resist historicization as an example of genocide.
Politicizing the Holocaust
At the same time the Holocaust was being historicized, it was being increasingly politicized as well. Broadly speaking, the "politicization" of the Holocaust refers to a process of appropriation and distortion that, beginning in the late 1960s and rapidly gaining momentum in the 1970s and 1980s, manifested itself in numerous different forms. Five of the most important may be referred to as: "dejudaizing," "Americanizing," "stealing," "denying," and "normalizing" the Holocaust. Despite their differences, each of these trends was informed by a concrete political agenda and served to reduce the Holocausts Jewish character. 27 Central to these groups' claims was the charge that the Holocaust was a propaganda hoax fabricated by "the Zionists" in order to justify the creation of, and compel subsequent international support for, the state of Israel. Significantly, this specific charge of fabrication, which some perceived as motivated by crass antisemitism, would resurface in milder form during die current debate over uniqueness in the accusations of certain critics that the Holocaust was being instrumentally used by "the Zionists" for political purposes. 31 According to Bauer, who was the most prominent and outspoken proponent of uniqueness in this period, the Holocaust was qualitatively different from other cases of genocide. The term "genocide," he argued, was best applied to the "murderous . .. denationalization" of peoples such as the Slavs and the Gypsies by the Nazis during the Second World War, as well as to the partial decimation of other groups in the twentieth century. 32 In contrast, since the Nazis' murderous assault against European Jewry entailed the "ideologically motivated planned total murder of a whole people," it represented an "extreme" form of genocide and deserved the separate designation "Holocaust." 33 This definition of uniqueness as a combination of intent and ideology was, to be sure, not the only one; 34 still, its succinctness earned it widespread support among scholars, as well as a more or less normative status in the larger discourse. The upsurge in scholarly attention to the Holocaust's uniqueness at this time was meant to counter the event's increasing historicization and politicization; during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a wide range of scholars pointed to both trends. Saul Friedlander, for one, was vocal in expressing doubts about the process of historicization, highlighting what he took to be the inability of generalizing theories to explain the event.
35 Meanwhile Yehuda Bauer, Lucy Dawidowicz, and others advanced the concept of uniqueness as an explicit means of combating its politically-motivated "mystification." 36 Despite their emphatic character, however, these initial efforts to defend the Holocausts uniqueness in the early 1980s proved incapable of halting the processes of historicization and politicization, both of which intensified later in the decade. Moreover, in the wake of the attempted "normalization" of the Holocaust in West Germany during the Historians' Debate, scholars committed to the uniqueness concept resolved to redouble its defense. It was against this backdrop that new studies reasserting the Holocausts uniqueness began to appear in the 1990s. Amongst the most prominent (and subsequently most criticized) were Deborah Lipstadt's Denying the Holocaust (1993) and Daniel Goldhagens Hitler's Willing Executioners (1996) . 37 Although these books were dedicated to different analytical projects, they clearly highlighted the issue of the Holocaust's singularity in their broader narratives. Lipstadt's book was primarily an exposition and refutation of Holocaust denial, but it also responded to the more subtle attempts to normalize the Holocaust in Germany by demonstrating the fallacies of comparing it to Stalinist terror and the Armenian and Cambodian genocides.
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Similarly, while Goldhagen s book responded to Arno Mayer and Christopher Browning's deemphasis of antisemitism as a causal factor for the Holocaust by asserting the importance of "eliminationist antisemitism," the author also stressed how the Germans' obsessive hatred of the Jews made the Holocaust unique. 39 Unlike other genocides, which "occurred in the context of some preexisting realistic conflict (territorial, class, ethnic, or religious)," the Holocaust, Goldhagen argued, was motivated by "an absolutely fantastical" German hatred of the Jews without basis in reality. What made the Holocaust "distinctive," he wrote, stemmed from a demonizing German racial antisemitism, an antisemitism that produced the will for comprehensive killing of jews in all lands despite the absence of any objective prior conflict with Jews; that, because of its fantastical construction of Jewry, demanded, unlike in other genocides, the total extermination of the Jews, so that no "germ-cell" would remain to spawn this eternal enemy anew; that energized the Germans' campaign of annihilation such that they could coordinate and persist in this enormous, continent-wide project; and that imbued the perpetrators with a rage, a lust for vengeance, that unleashed the unprecedented cruelty.
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Although uniqueness was not central to Goldhagen s study (which was controversial for many other reasons), this and other assertions ("The Holocaust was a radical break with everything known in human history") clearly distinguished him as an outspoken advocate of the concept.
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Still, no matter how emphatic scholars like Goldhagen and Lipstadt were in advancing the notion of uniqueness, none was as ambitious or exhaustive as Steven Katz, who in 1994 published the first massive volume of his projected three-volume work, The Holocaust in Historical Context. 42 Katz had also undertaken his study to counter the twin trends of historicization and politicization. Unlike scholars such as Saul Friedlander, who saw the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a barrier to its historicization, Katz wanted to historicize the Holocaust specifically in order to prove its uniqueness. 43 Katz's notion of historicization led him to contextualize the Holocaust by doggedly contrasting it to all prior episodes of mass murder in recorded human history. In so doing, Katz, like most of the scholars who preceded him, defined the singularity of the Holocaust in the actualized intent of Hitler and the Nazis to exterminate the Jewish people in its entirety. For Katz, it was the unmediated, intended, complete physical eradication of every Jewish man, woman, and child that defines the particular, singular nature of ... the Holocaust . . . and distinguishes [it] . . . from prior and to date subsequent . . . acts of collective violence, ethnocide, and mass murder.
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In the process of distinguishing the Holocaust from other episodes of mass murder, however, Katz qualitatively elevated it above them. While defenders of uniqueness, such as Yehuda Bauer, had recognized the occurrence of other cases of genocide and had defined the Holocaust as an extreme version of it, Katz narrowed the definition of genocide in such a way as to make the Holocaust the only true case of genocide ever to occur. As he wrote:
I shall use the following rigorous definition: the concept of genocide applies only when there is an actualized intent, however successfully carried out, to physically destroy an entire group (as a group is defined by the perpetrators). Any form of mass murder that does not conform to the definition provided here, though not necessarily less immoral or less evil, will not be identified [as] genocide. 45 In the process, Katz implicitly demoted other cases of mass killing-which had until then been described as genocidal in character-into something less than genocide. Although he took pains to emphasize that this process of redefinition did not entail a diminishing of other peoples' sufferings, let alone constitute an apology for them, Katz drastically underestimated the sharp critical reaction that his project would inevitably generate.
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The New Assaylt upon Umiiqiuieiness Beginning in 1996, the debate over uniqueness became heated as several scholars launched a vigorous offensive against the controversial concept. This offensive differed markedly from previous attacks. While in the early 1980s uniqueness critics had come mostly from within the Jewish community, the new offensive was predominantly led by non-Jews (but also by Jews outside the mainstream American Jewish community) and was thus more polemical in character. 47 This assault originated in books and articles and soon spilled over into academic publications, political journals, and internet discussion groups. 48 In were, in effect, denying all other genocides. Insisting that the notion of uniqueness necessarily entailed the "trivialization or even outright denial of the genocidal suffering of others," Stannard called it both "racist" and "violence-provoking." Not only did the advocates of uniqueness diminish the sufferings of other peoples, he argued, but they provided "a screen behind which opportunistic governments today attempt to conceal their own past and ongoing genocidal actions."
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The tone of Stannard's accusations reflected his own scholarly and political concerns. As a scholar of the genocide of Native American peoples and author of the provocative book American Holocaust (1992), Stannard was angered by what he perceived as a double standard in the United States towards "worthy" and "unworthy" victims. While Americans readily acknowledged the Nazi crimes against the Jews, he wrote, they continued "to turn their backs on the even more massive genocide that for four grisly centuries was perpetrated against . . . the 'unworthy' natives of the Americas."
52 By 1996, Stannard believed that he had found an explanation for this historical oversight, charging that the notion of the Holocaust's uniqueness had supplied Americans with an easy pretext for ignoring their own nation's murderous crimes. As he argued in "Uniqueness as Denial":
The willful maintenance of public ignorance regarding the genocidal and racist horrors against indigenous peoples that have been and are being perpetrated by many nations In this effort, Stannard stressed the many similarities between the Nazis' persecution of the Jews and the mass murder of Native American peoples by European and American settlers. Focusing first on the outcomes of the two genocides, he pointed out that, in terms of the sheer number of deaths and the proportion of the population killed, the Native American genocide exceeded that of the Holocaust. Between fifty and 100 million persons, comprising ninety to ninety-five percent of the hemisphere's indigenous inhabitants, were killed in North America, as opposed to around six million Jews, comprising sixty-six percent of European and thirtythree percent of world Jewry. 55 The means of death used in the two genocides, he added, were also similar, ranging from massacres, forced labor, disease, starvation, exposure, and other hardships. 56 In response to the claims of Katz and others that most Native Americans had died from precisely such unintended "natural" causes, Stannard argued that just as many Jews died from such causes as were murdered outright. Since these victims, he noted, were always considered Holocaust victims, why should their comparable Native American counterparts not be considered victims of genocide?
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Beyond drawing parallels between the outcomes of the two genocides, Stannard compared the similar intentions behind them. In order to challenge the trump card held by the defenders of uniqueness-namely the claim that Hitler had intended to kill the Jewish people in its entirety-Stannard first attempted to diminish intent as a factor for evaluating the qualitative character of a genocide. It was futile, he argued, to determine which was worse: the "failed intent to kill all the members of a given group [or] the successful extermination of an entire people [without] an ideology of extermination on the part of the perpetrators."
58 Why, in other words, should the Nazis' failure to achieve their goal of killing the entire Jewish people make the Holocaust a worse example of mass murder than the almost completely successful, if only partially intended, genocide of Native Americans? Yet in truth, Stannard went on to argue, the documented existence of "many pre-twentieth-century examples of unambiguous official calls by European or white American political leaders for the total annihilation of... individual Native American peoples" revealed that the Jews were hardly the only people ever to have been slated for total destruction. 59 Further, Stannard asserted, while the Nazis certainly intended to kill Jews, there was no longstanding comprehensive plan to kill the people in its entirety. 60 The lack of documentary evidence for "a Nazi. . . 'plan' to kill every Jew on earth," the willingness of Nazi leaders like Heinrich Himmler to spare Jewish lives near the end of the war in exchange for cash and goods, and the exemption of certain classes of Jews-those of mixed parentage, or Mischlinge, and small groups of Karaites-from extermination all contradicted the claim that the Jews were marked for death in their entirety. The willingness to spare Jewish lives demonstrated that the Nazis were quite capable of pragmatism and were far from beholden to a unique, "pseudo-religious mania" for killing the Jews as a people. 61 Not only in a comparative sense, but on its own terms, therefore, the Holocaust was far from unique. Beyond dismantling the notion of uniqueness from an empirical perspective, Stannard strongly criticized both its underlying political motivations and its allegedly adverse effect upon public consciousness. The defenders of uniqueness, he claimed, were not scholars but ideologues who resembled "conspiracy theorists" or members of a "cult."
62 Indeed, uniqueness was a kind of "religious dogma" that found a suitable home in, and aptly expressed the values of, the "theocratic state" of Israel. 63 For Stannard, Jews both inside and outside Israel had embraced uniqueness both for ethnocentric reasons (to reinforce the notion that they were a "Chosen People") and power political ones (to justify the state's "territorial expansion and suppression of the Palestinian people"). 64 Additionally, the Jewish defense of uniqueness oppressed other groups like the Armenians, whose genocide was denied by the Israeli government as part of a craven quid pro quo with Turkey. 65 In considering the adverse effect that uniqueness had upon public awareness of the genocides of Gypsies and Native Americans, it was unmistakably clear to Stannard that the Jews' "manufactured claims of uniqueness for their own people are . Convinced of the threat to truth and memory posed by the defenders of uniqueness, Churchill challenged the concept on historical and empirical grounds. Like Stannard, he not only underlined the parallels between the Holocaust and the Native American genocide, but also stressed the similarities between the Nazi persecution of Jews and non-Jews alike. 73 In this latter context, Churchill hoped to reverse what he took to be the deliberate downgrading of other victim groups by Jewish "exclusivists," including the "invisible victims"-Gypsies, Russian POWs, civilians from Poland, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and other parts of the Soviet Union-as true Holocaust victims. Casualties usually labeled "war deaths," he argued, needed to be included under "nazi extermination policies," since there was little or no difference between the Nazis' plans for the Jews and their ultimate plans for other "inferior" groups. 74 Churchill thus drastically expanded the definition of the Holocaust upward, concluding: "the true human costs of nazi genocide came to twenty-six million or more, six million of whom were Jews, a million or more of whom were Gypsies, and the rest mostly Slavs.
Only with these facts clearly in mind can we say that we have apprehended the full scope of the Holocaust." 75 Churchill also shared Stannard's views on the political motivations and implications of the uniqueness claim, arguing that it served to compel permanent maintenance of the privileged political status of Israel, the Jewish state established on Arab land as an act of international atonement for the Holocaust, . . . to forge a secular reinforcement. . . of Judaism s theological belief in itself as comprising a ... "chosen" people, entitled to all the prerogatives of such, . . . and to construct a conceptual screen behind which to hide . . . Israel's ongoing genocide against the Palestinian population.
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In this way, Churchill did not merely echo but radically amplified the charges leveled by Stannard, concluding that the one-time victims of genocide, the Jews, had now become perpetrators of the same crime against their Palestinian neighbors.
Stannard and Churchill's highly politicized accusations against the defenders of uniqueness, moreover, were hardly isolated cases, as was demonstrated by Norman Finkelstein s polemical critique of Daniel Goldhagen s Hitler's Willing Executioners. In a long article that appeared in the New Left Review in the summer of 1997 and was subsequently revised and re-published in the book A Nation on Trial, Finkelstein attacked both the conceptual and political dimensions of the uniqueness concept. 77 According to him, Goldhagens depiction of the Germans' chronic, "eliminationist" hatred of the Jews as the motivating force behind the Holocaust mirrored one of the central tenets of "Holocaust literature"-that "Jews suffered uniquely in the Nazi holocaust and that the Nazi holocaust was unique in the annals of human suffering." 78 This claim of uniqueness was, in turn, an integral part of "Zionist ideology," which cited the eternal nature of gentile antisemitism and Jewish suffering as justifying "the necessity of the state of Israel." Further, inasmuch as this view supported the notion that "all critiques of Zionism are simply disguised forms of anti-Semitism," it "immunized" the Jewish state "from legitimate censure of its policies" and provided justification for "whatever expedient Jews might resort to, even aggression and torture [as] legitimate [acts of] self-defense." 79 As Stannard and Churchill, Finkelstein asserted that those scholars who viewed the Holocaust as a distinctly Jewish and a fundamentally unique event were part of a larger "propaganda enterprise" to exploit the past for political purposes.
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The assault upon uniqueness led by Stannard, Churchill, and Finkelstein generated a lively debate among scholars. As a flurry of articles and internet postings on H-Holocaust revealed during the summer of 1996 and spring of 1997, scholars seemed to split evenly on the issue. Among the uniqueness concept's critics, some, such as Henry Huttenbach, criticized Steven Katz for major errors of logic, while others, like Jonathan Petrie, charged Goldhagen with ignoring the non-Jewish victims of the Holocaust and practicing "a subtle form of genocide denial." 81 Still other critics challenged the special significance accorded the Holocaust by drawing attention to the mass killings undertaken by Mao Zedong in China and Josef Stalin in the Soviet Union. 82 Among the defenders of uniqueness, David G. Myers criticized both Petrie and Stannard, highlighting how the latter's polemical observations in particular resembled "classic antisemitic accusation[s] against the Jews." 83 Other defenders also questioned the motives behind the critics of uniqueness and suggested blocking their further participation on the list-serve. 84 This call for censorship surfaced in far more sensational fashion in early 1998, when the Anti-Defamation League tried to halt the publication of A Nation on Trial. 85 As indicated both by these contributions and a growing interest in the subject in Europe, the uniqueness issue has sparked nearly as much political controversy as intellectual engagement.
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Evaluating the Debate
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the recent debate has done little to advance our understanding of modem genocide and much to hinder it. The critics of uniqueness, Stannard and Churchill in particular, have made some important points and should be praised for their efforts to increase public awareness of the past and present-day sufferings of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. To read Churchill's disturbing accounts of the recent sufferings of native peoples in Central and South America further underscores the political importance of increased awareness of the ongoing threat of genocide. 87 A comparison of the genocide of Native Americans and the Holocaust is not only a potentially useful scholarly tool for clarifying the important similarities and differences between the two events, but one with obvious political significance as well. Finkelstein s work, for its part, should also be accorded a degree of recognition for its rigorous, although far from the first or most original, critique of Goldhagen's flawed bestseller. This being said, the work of Stannard, Churchill, and Finkelstein is also seriously marred by careless research, historical errors, and recklessly tendentious political barbs. 88 Stannard's attempt to fashion the sufferings of Native Americans into a genocide on par with the Holocaust fails in several respects. Even if his impressive statistics regarding the decimation of Native American populations following the arrival of European colonists are accurate-and there is evidence to show they are inflated-the issue of intent remains a crucial difference between the two cases.
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While it is true that both Jews and Native Americans died from many causes-massacres, hunger, disease, and exhaustion among others-there is no escaping the fact that all Jewish deaths in the Holocaust, regardless of how they occurred, were intended by the Nazis. 90 In contrast, while Native Americans were also killed intentionally, a far higher proportion died from diseases contracted through simple contact with Europeans, who did not, it should be stressed, arrive in the New World bent upon extermination. 91 Jewish deaths in ghettos and concentration camps through "natural" causes thus cannot be equated with the allegedly similar "natural" deaths of Native Americans, since the former would have been killed in the extermination camps had they survived long enough to be sent there.
Furthermore, Stannard and Churchill encounter difficulties in their attempts to disprove the notion that the Nazis planned to kill the Jewish people in its entirety. Stannard is correct in pointing to the absence of documentation for the Nazis' explicit plans to eradicate the Jewish people. The strong likelihood, of course, is that such documents never existed in written form and will never be discovered. In their absence, the best proof of the totality of the Nazis' genocidal project is the singlemindedness of their pursuit of the Jews across the European continent-from Finland to Salonika to the Channel Islands-even into the last days of the war. This obsessive pursuit certainly bears out Yehuda Bauer's claim that the Nazis tried to kill as many Jews as "they could lay hands on." 92 The alleged examples of Nazi pragma-tism cited by Stannard are exceptional incidents that do not disprove this larger point. Himmler's apparent willingness to spare Jewish lives near the end of the war was less a reflection of official policy than its unraveling. Indeed, it mostly reflected the SS leaders idiosyncratic attempt, in view of the impending defeat, to save his own skinfor which he was famously disowned by a furious Hitler who never wavered in his pursuit of the Final Solution. 93 Additionally, the alleged exemption of certain "Jews"-whether Mischlinge or Karaites-from extermination can be explained by the fact that the Nazis did not consider such persons to be Jews in the first place. In other words, such exemptions should not be interpreted as an easing of ideological tenacity. 94 Furthermore, the exemption of these "Jews" differentiates the Jewish fate in the Holocaust from that of the Gypsies, whom Stannard, Churchill, and Ian Hancock also claim were slated for total extermination. 95 Official Nazi policy towards the Gypsies was marked by far less consistency than that towards the Jews. So while certain racially "pure" German Gypsies were not targeted for death, and while some Gypsies in other Nazi-occupied countries were left unmolested, all Jews whom the Nazis viewed as Jews (and the definition was quite broad) were designated for destruction. 96 Finally, Churchill's claim that Slavic groups would have been targeted for eventual total extermination remains a hypothetical, not an historical argument-one, moreover, that is not convincingly supported by the evidence. 97 Apart from the historical deficiencies of their critiques of uniqueness, both Stannard and Churchill err gravely in claiming that uniqueness necessarily implies denial. While both scholars equate the two throughout their work, they rarely provide much convincing evidence for the linkage. The closest they come to doing so is in arguing that the "exclusivist" position provides ammunition to those who are already eager to ignore past and present-day occurrences of genocide. While the concept of uniqueness does potentially permit such instrumental usage, as demonstrated by the Turkish government's support of it in their denial of the Armenian genocide, such a practice clearly represents a case of abuse. It is driven by apologetic motives and does not reveal any flaws in the concept itself.
The fact that uniqueness is not inherently linked to denial is further illustrated in the American context. Stannard and Churchill are manifestly wrong to blame the notion of uniqueness for the widespread ignorance of the Native American genocide, for our knowledge of this shameful period of American history was hardly more widespread before the Holocaust. Indeed, a growing sense of shame for this dishonorable legacy, and horror of genocide in general, has been advanced, not inhibited, by our growing attention and sensitivity to the Nazi slaughter of European Jewry. Lingering difficulties in confronting America's own past, therefore, should not be blamed upon Jewish Holocaust scholars but upon those members of the American historical and political establishment who have been truly responsible for the chronic neglect of the full dimensions of Native American history.
Further, the claim that Jewish scholars of the Holocaust have actively or inten-tionally promoted the denial of other genocides is simply unsustainable. This is primarily due to the fact that, for better or worse, most of these scholars have seldom given extended attention to other genocides. Even if Churchill is only exaggerating slightly when he describes this lack of attention as a "thundering silence," his equation of this silence with the outright "denial of the American holocaust" is wholly unwarranted. 98 It is true that most Holocaust scholars have not investigated the comparative dimensions of the Holocaust and other genocides at great length, but the ignorance imputed to them (epitomized by Stannard s unfair criticism of Yehuda Bauer's typographical error referring to the "Pierce Nez," rather than the Nez Perce Indians) cannot fairly be equated with denial. 99 Thus even a scholar as widely criticized as The purported lack of Jewish interest in other genocides certainly cannot be compared to the politically-motivated agendas of Holocaust deniers, who willfully deny the Holocaust's very occurrence. Far from actively denying other genocides, many Jewish scholars as well as major Holocaust institutions, such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Simon Wiesenthal Center, have asserted the historical specificity of the Holocaust and also directed attention toward the mass murder of other groups. 102 The best example is the much-maligned Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel, whose commitment to the lessons of the Holocaust prompted him not only to express his shock over the genocide of the Ache Indians in Paraguay in the 1970s, but also motivated his more recent admonishment of President Clinton to stop the "ethnic cleansing" in war-torn Yugoslavia. 103 Stannard, Churchill, and Finkelstein all err, moreover, in their zealous attempts to uncover a political agenda lurking behind the notion of uniqueness. To begin with, they are mistaken in their essentialist description of uniqueness as "Jewish" in character. 104 Although they pointedly cite the Jewish identity of scholars defending uniqueness to prove that its currency reflects Jewish ethnocentrism and Zionist political aims, they fail to acknowledge that the thesis enjoys widespread support among prominent non-Jewish scholars. 105 More specifically, their charge that the notion of uniqueness is part of a larger Zionist plot to legitimize the actions of the state of Israel is wholly unsubstantiated. While the notion of uniqueness can clearly serve diverse political agendas, there is no evidence that its many defenders have embraced it for purely political reasons. 108 Accusations to this effect are not only grossly unfair, but dangerous, as indicated by the recent surfacing of Norman Finkelstein's arguments against the Holocaust "industry" on the websites of extreme right-wing Holocaust deniers. 109 Finally, the credibility of the charges leveled by the critics of uniqueness is undermined by the double standards underlying their own arguments. It is ironic to see Ward Churchill criticize Jewish scholars for asserting the Holocaust's uniqueness and then claim uniqueness for his own people's sufferings. When he asserts that "The American Holocaust ... remains unparalleled both in ... its magnitude and the degree to which its goals were met," he employs categorical statements that weaken his own criticisms of the notion of uniqueness. 110 
Taking Stock of the Debate: Explanations and Conclusions
However flawed these criticisms of uniqueness are, it is worth pondering the reasons for their sudden appearance. The current debate seems to be the product of a propitious constellation of cultural, political, and scholarly trends. One crucial precondition is the tendency-traceable to the upsurge of "multiculturalism" in the late 1990s-of ethnic groups to justify present-day demands by citing past wrongs. In this atmosphere of victimization, a genocidal past is an obvious political asset, and Stannard and Churchill's attempts to raise awareness of the "American Holocaust" merely mirror those of other groups to draw attention to their own "Holocausts." 113 The fact The emphatically politicized tone of the debate has diminished its contribution to our understanding of the Holocaust and genocide. Yet the debate itself has raised important questions concerning the utility of the uniqueness concept. In many ways, the controversy has resulted from the concept's very ambiguity. "Uniqueness" not only suffers from a lack of linguistic clarity-it suggests both "unprecedented" and "unrepeatable"-but yields very different conclusions depending upon the analytical perspective: historical, philosophical, theological, and so on. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust has been defined in a variety of ways. 114 Yet even if there were a consensus, it remains unclear what the significance of this would be. That such an event can never occur again? That German and Jewish history are singularly and forever burdened? By all indications, this problem still awaits its answer. Indeed, it is significant that the scholar most engaged in exploring the issue of uniqueness, Steven Katz, has done more to provide empirical support for it than to elucidate its significance. 115 Furthermore, "uniqueness" is a concept of questionable utility given the misunderstanding it has provoked as a qualitative concept carrying a moral judgment. This connotation, to be sure, is not implicit in the term: there is no reason why empirically distinguishing the Holocaust from other genocides is synonymous with declaring it a greater evil. Steven Katz has made this point convincingly, but unfortunately he has undercut its persuasiveness by adopting a highly restricted definition of genocide, rendering the concept politically inflammatory. To be sure, Katz could have pursued the same comparative research agenda, argued that the Nazis' intent to kill the entire Jewish people made the Holocaust different from all other cases of mass murder, and referred to these cases (as did Yehuda Bauer) as "genocide." By failing to do so, his book needlessly offended groups extremely sensitive to the neglect of their historical experiences, opening its author to the charge of establishing a "hierarchy of victims." Katz's opponents have impugned his scholarship unfairly, but he might have antici-pated the reaction and considered more carefully the pursuit of scholarly conclusions the potential fruits of which were destined to be outweighed by the risks.
Given the ambiguity attending the concept of uniqueness and the tendency for it to cause serious misunderstandings, what, if anything, speaks for retaining it as a category of historical analysis? We have seen that the concept originated as a defensive and rhetorically powerful response to those who have attempted to normalize, universalize, or otherwise distort the Holocaust. As such, it deserves to be held in reserve as a means of responding to those who would seek to violate the historicity and minimize the significance of the Nazi's destruction of European Jewry. However, as the considerable costs of the concept's rhetorical power have become increasingly apparent, uniqueness has come to be regarded by some as a truth-in-itself, to be guarded vigilantly against any perceived "assault." Yet not all "assaults" against the Holocaust's uniqueness are equally threatening: scholarly projects of historical comparison are not all the same, and they should not all be misinterpreted as politicallydriven acts of normalization. Given the drawbacks of uniqueness, might the concept not be replaced by a less attention-grabbing but more precise term, such as "distinctiveness" or "particularity?" However imperfect, these alternate terms would not inhibit exploration of the historical differences between the Holocaust and other genocides, and might even help allay the suspicions of those who view Holocaust studies as an intolerant, hegemonic project.
A deemphasis on the term "uniqueness" would appear to be particularly timely, moreover, in view of the Holocaust's ongoing historicization. As the significance of the Holocaust is increasingly conceived in universal terms, those who continue to advocate its uniqueness will be seen as pursuing a quixotic task. Their battle against universalization is destined to be a losing one, as the term "Holocaust" has already become an ideal-type construct. As demonstrated by the continual (re)discovery of "forgotten Holocausts," it should be apparent that the term is no longer understood as a referent solely to the Nazi destruction of the Jews. Its inflation has complex causes, but however one understands this change, the following seems certain: over time, the specifically Jewish connotation acquired by the word "holocaust" in the postwar period will fade, facilitating the restoration of its original, universalistic meaning. Given this likely eventuality, the choice for the defenders of uniqueness is a difficult one: to lay monopolistic claim to a term increasingly understood in a broader sense, or to abandon it in favor of a more particularistic designation such as "Shoah," a term which has recently come into its own as an alternate designation for the Holocaust in its specifically Jewish dimensions. This practice of linguistic ethnicization, paralleled in the increasing usage of "Porrajmos" to refer to the genocide of the Gypsies, may satisfy those who wish to retain an exclusive claim to "their" Holocaust. Others, however, will surely oppose the abandonment of "Holocaust" as an act of surrender, the premature relinquishment of a resonant, widely-recognized term that has come to refer to a crucial historical experience of the Jewish people. 116 Ultimately, however, both options will probably yield the same result. Just as adhering to a term of increasingly universalistic significance will gradually erode awareness of its Jewish dimensions, so too will adopting a particularist designation such as "Shoah." Either way, the fate of the Jews in the Third Reich will likely be remembered with decreasing clarity by the public at large.
Jean Amery thus appears to have been more correct than not in forecasting the submergence of the Holocaust within a larger "century of barbarism." As the process of historicization advances, the term "Holocaust" will become an increasingly generic one. Not only will it become progressively indistinguishable from "genocide," but it Likely will be taken as a broader designation for victimization itself. This long-term eventuality no doubt will be disheartening to those committed to defending what they see as the Holocaust's uniqueness. But it is a trend that cannot be halted, only subjected to continuous scrutiny. The importance of such scrutiny, however, should not be underestimated, for it alone can nullify the effects of the polemical excesses that, as the current debate over uniqueness demonstrates, will inevitably accompany the Holocaust's ongoing historicization. In the end, it will not be through polemics, but rather through continued research, scholarly debate, and public engagement, that the Holocaust's historical specificity has any hope of being preserved. 4. Isaac Deutscher wrote that "for the historian trying to comprehend the ... holocaust, the greatest obstacle will be the absolute uniqueness of the catastrophe. . . . The fury of Nazism, which was bent on the unconditional extermination of every Jewish man, woman, and child within its reach, passes the comprehension of a historian. . . . [We] are confronted here by a huge and ominous mystery . . . that will forever baffle and terrify mankind. 12. Zitelmann and his colleagues rejected the claim by scholars such as Dan Diner that the Holocausts incomparability prevents its historicization, arguing that this placed "an unacceptable limit upon historical inquiry" (Frageverbot 29. Among the dissenting observers, Ismar Schorsch criticized the notion of uniqueness as "a distasteful secular version of chosenness" that "impedes genuine dialogue" and "alienates potential allies from among other victims of organized human depravity." For a broader overview, 38. Lipstadt insisted that these cases, while horrific, were fundamentally different since neither was "part of a process of total annihilation of an entire people." Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust, p. 212.
39. Although Goldhagen opposed Mayer and Brownings approach to historicization, he did not reject historicization as such. This is clear from his opposition to the notion that the Holocaust was "inexplicable," and his simple affirmation that his book aimed "to explain why the Holocaust occurred, to explain how it could occur"; p. 5.
40. P. 414. Goldhagen added: "The geographic scope of the Germans' exterminationist drive . . . has no parallel, certainly not in the twentieth century. The Germans sought to uncover and kill Jews everywhere they could, outside their country and the territories that they controlled, ultimately throughout the world. Not just the spatial reach but the comprehensiveness of the Germans' extermination of the Jews is also distinctive. Every last Jew, every Jewish child, had to die"; p. 412. 43. In writing "It is my intention to establish the uniqueness of the Sho'ah precisely by historicizing it," Katz particularly aimed to refute the work of Ernst Nolte: "It is my firm belief that concluding for uniqueness . . . provides the most appropriate . . . response to ... Nolte s historical revisionism"; The Holocaust in Historical Context, p. 25. Beyond challenging Nolte's attempts to "normalize" the Holocaust, Katz also sought to counter its conceptual inflation by scholars of the Native American, Armenian, Gypsy, Homosexual, and African "Holocausts," among others (p. 18).
44. The Holocaust in Historical Context, p. 10. Katz declared that he had framed his "definition of uniqueness in terms of intentionality," arguing that "only the element of intentionality can serve as the individuating criterion by which to distinguish the Sho'ah from other instances of mass death" (pp. 13-14). The Holocaust, he argued, represented "a phenomenological and historical novum," "an event without real precedent or parallel in modern history" (p. 24). And further, that "the Holocaust is phenomenologically unique by virtue of the fact that never before has a state set out, as a matter of intentional principle and actualized policy, to annihilate physically every man, woman, and child belonging to a specific people" (p. 28). exaggerates the sufferings of the Jews (who, as is well known, were not exterminated in their entirety). Significantly, both misquote and distort the meaning of Bauer's original sentence, which does not include the word "the" before "Jews" ("total physical annihilation ... is what happened to Jews."). Given that Bauer defines the term Holocaust as "the planned total annihilation of a whole people (emphasis added)," it is clear that his intention was to refer to the totalizing agenda behind the Final Solution, rather than its results. "Is the Holocaust Explicable?" in Yehuda Bauer, et al., eds., Remembering for the Future: Working Papers and Addenda, Volume II (Oxford, 1989), p. 1,973.
(2) Churchill falsely accuses Lucy Dawidowicz of having "sweepingly accused those suggesting that the U.S. transatlantic slave trade was genocidal-or by extension, that U.S. extermination campaigns against American Indians were the same-not only of antisemitism but of'a vicious anti-Americanism.'" Churchill, pp. 50-51. In fact, Dawidowicz's remark about anti-Americanism refers neither to the slave trade nor to American Indians, but to a general tendency of Americans (such as "extremist blacks" and "antiabortionists") to apply the term genocide to contemporary American ills such as urban slums or abortion. It is against this background that Dawidowicz wrote "when they equate National Socialist Germany with the United States, they bespeak a vicious anti-Americanism." Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians, p. 17.
(3) Churchill's book reveals numerous errors reflecting sloppy or hasty scholarship. These include, among others, his mistaken references to "Robert" (instead of Michael) Marrus (p. 14, n. 18; p. 258, n. 82) and to John "Cuddly" instead of Cuddihy (p. 79, n. 48); his reversal of the first and last names of Yitzhak Arad and Uriel Tal; his inclusion of Sebastian Haffner among the ranks of Jewish scholars (pp. 77-78, n. 24); and his misdating of the Wannsee Conference, which he implies took place in April 1942 (p. 39). 90. Stannard is sorely mistaken in claiming that as many Jews died through "natural" causes as were killed by the Einsatzgruppen or murdered in the extermination camps. Stannard drew upon Arno Mayers Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?, which asserted (without empirical support) this claim. Stannard's attempts to provide statistical support for Mayer are unconvincing. He arbitrarily uses the death rate at Buchenwald (where around 56,000 people died) as a basis of comparison with death rates suffered by Native Americans in Spanish missions, concluding that "by the time the mission camps were shut down, starvation, disease, torture, and . . . murder had killed a proportion of the native inmate population more than three times larger than ... at Buchenwald." "Uniqueness as Denial," pp. 179-80. Why Buchenwald, which was hardly the most deadly of the camps-indeed, not an extermination camp at all-should be a basis of comparison remains unclear. The following statistics reveal the flaws in Stannard and Mayer's work: Of 1.3 million people deported to Auschwitz, of whom 1.1 million-approximately eighty-five percent-were Jews, only 400,000 were given prisoner status and permitted to live temporarily. Around one-half of these prisoners were Jews, the other half mostly Poles. The remaining 900,000 (mostly Jews) were gassed shortly after arrival. In other words, only 200,000 of the 1.1 million Jews deported to Auschwitz (eighteen percent) had even the possibility of dying of "natural" causes. For recent figures, see Franciszek Piper, "The Number of Victims," pp. 61-80; and "The System of Prisoner Exploitation," pp. 34-49; both in Yisrael Gutman and Michael Berenbaum, eds., Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).
